# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2014 Legrandin # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause """ Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). """ from __future__ import annotations from hmac import compare_digest from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Optional, Union, overload __all__ = ["GcmMode"] from binascii import unhexlify from Crypto import MessageTooLongError from Crypto.Cipher._state_machine import Method from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes from Crypto.Util import _cpu_features from Crypto.Util._raw_api import ( SmartPointer, VoidPointer, c_size_t, c_uint8_ptr, c_uint8_ptr_len, create_string_buffer, get_raw_buffer, is_buffer, load_pycryptodome_raw_lib, ) from Crypto.Util._threads import range_boundaries, run_in_threads from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes if TYPE_CHECKING: from types import ModuleType Buffer = Union[bytes, bytearray, memoryview] # C API by module implementing GHASH _ghash_api_template = """ int ghash_%imp%(uint8_t y_out[16], const uint8_t block_data[], size_t len, const uint8_t y_in[16], const void *exp_key); int ghash_expand_%imp%(const uint8_t h[16], void **ghash_tables); int ghash_destroy_%imp%(void *ghash_tables); int ghash_at_%imp%(uint8_t y_out[16], const uint8_t block_data[], size_t offset, size_t len, const uint8_t y_in[16], const void *exp_key); int ghash_combine_%imp%(uint8_t y_out[16], const uint8_t y_in[16], size_t n_blocks, const uint8_t g[16], const void *exp_key); """ def _build_impl(lib, postfix): from collections import namedtuple funcs = ("ghash", "ghash_expand", "ghash_destroy", "ghash_at", "ghash_combine") GHASH_Imp = namedtuple("_GHash_Imp", funcs) try: imp_funcs = [getattr(lib, x + "_" + postfix) for x in funcs] except AttributeError: # Make sphinx stop complaining with its mocklib imp_funcs = [None] * len(funcs) params = dict(zip(funcs, imp_funcs)) return GHASH_Imp(**params) def _get_ghash_portable(): api = _ghash_api_template.replace("%imp%", "portable") lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Crypto.Hash._ghash_portable", api) result = _build_impl(lib, "portable") return result _ghash_portable = _get_ghash_portable() def _get_ghash_clmul(): """Return the implementation with the carry-less multiplication of the CPU (PCLMULQDQ on x86, PMULL on AArch64), or None if it is not available""" if _cpu_features.have_clmul(): name, postfix = "Crypto.Hash._ghash_clmul", "clmul" elif _cpu_features.have_pmull(): name, postfix = "Crypto.Hash._ghash_pmull", "pmull" else: return None try: api = _ghash_api_template.replace("%imp%", postfix) lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib(name, api) result = _build_impl(lib, postfix) except OSError: result = None return result _ghash_clmul = _get_ghash_clmul() # Minimum amount of data that each thread must authenticate: # with less, starting the thread costs more than what it saves. # The CLMUL (or PMULL) implementation is much faster, so it needs more data. _MIN_BYTES_PER_THREAD_CLMUL = 2 * 1024 * 1024 _MIN_BYTES_PER_THREAD_PORTABLE = 256 * 1024 # See NIST SP 800 38D, 5.2.1.1: at most 2**39 - 256 bits of plaintext # (the 32-bit block counter must not wrap around), and 2**64 - 1 bits of AAD _MAX_MSG_LEN = 2**36 - 32 _MAX_AAD_LEN = 2**61 - 1 class _GHASH: """GHASH function defined in NIST SP 800-38D, Algorithm 2. If X_1, X_2, .. X_m are the blocks of input data, the function computes: X_1*H^{m} + X_2*H^{m-1} + ... + X_m*H in the Galois field GF(2^256) using the reducing polynomial (x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1). With more than one thread, long data is split into ranges, which are hashed in parallel and then combined with: GHASH(A || B) = GHASH(A) * H^{len(B)} + GHASH(B) """ def __init__(self, subkey, ghash_c, threads=1): assert len(subkey) == 16 self.ghash_c = ghash_c self._threads = threads self._exp_key = VoidPointer() result = ghash_c.ghash_expand(c_uint8_ptr(subkey), self._exp_key.address_of()) if result: raise ValueError("Error %d while expanding the GHASH key" % result) self._exp_key = SmartPointer(self._exp_key.get(), ghash_c.ghash_destroy) # create_string_buffer always returns a string of zeroes self._last_y = create_string_buffer(16) def update(self, block_data): assert len(block_data) % 16 == 0 block_data_ptr, block_data_len = c_uint8_ptr_len(block_data) if self.ghash_c is _ghash_clmul: min_bytes = _MIN_BYTES_PER_THREAD_CLMUL else: min_bytes = _MIN_BYTES_PER_THREAD_PORTABLE threads = min(self._threads, block_data_len // min_bytes) if threads > 1: self._update_threaded(block_data_ptr, block_data_len, threads) return self result = self.ghash_c.ghash( self._last_y, block_data_ptr, c_size_t(block_data_len), self._last_y, self._exp_key.get(), ) if result: raise ValueError("Error %d while updating GHASH" % result) return self def _update_threaded(self, block_data_ptr: Any, block_data_len: int, threads: int) -> None: """Hash the data in ``threads`` contiguous ranges, in parallel. The calling thread processes the first range. ``block_data_ptr`` is a C pointer, whose type depends on the backend (cffi or ctypes): see :mod:`Crypto.Util._raw_api`.""" # Ranges differ by at most one block bounds = range_boundaries(block_data_len, threads, 16) # The first range continues from the current value; # the others start from zero, and are combined later partials: list[Any] = [self._last_y] + [create_string_buffer(16) for _ in range(1, threads)] def worker(i: int) -> int: return self.ghash_c.ghash_at( partials[i], block_data_ptr, c_size_t(bounds[i]), c_size_t(bounds[i + 1] - bounds[i]), partials[i], self._exp_key.get(), ) for result in run_in_threads(worker, threads): if result: raise ValueError("Error %d while updating GHASH" % result) for i in range(1, threads): result = self.ghash_c.ghash_combine( self._last_y, self._last_y, c_size_t((bounds[i + 1] - bounds[i]) // 16), partials[i], self._exp_key.get(), ) if result: raise ValueError("Error %d while combining GHASH" % result) def digest(self): return get_raw_buffer(self._last_y) def enum(**enums): return type("Enum", (), enums) MacStatus = enum(PROCESSING_AUTH_DATA=1, PROCESSING_CIPHERTEXT=2) class GcmMode: """Galois Counter Mode (GCM). This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (`AEAD`_) mode. It provides both confidentiality and authenticity. The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed, and it will still be subject to authentication. The decryption step tells the receiver if the message comes from a source that really knows the secret key. Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message - including the header - has been modified or corrupted. This mode requires a *nonce*. This mode is only available for ciphers that operate on 128 bits blocks (e.g. AES but not TDES). See `NIST SP800-38D`_. .. _`NIST SP800-38D`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf .. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html """ def __init__( self, factory: ModuleType, key: Buffer, nonce: Buffer, mac_len: int, cipher_params: dict, ghash_c: Any, threads: int = 1, ) -> None: self.block_size = factory.block_size if self.block_size != 16: raise ValueError("GCM mode is only available for ciphers that operate on 128 bits blocks") if len(nonce) == 0: raise ValueError("Nonce cannot be empty") if not is_buffer(nonce): raise TypeError("Nonce must be bytes, bytearray or memoryview") # See NIST SP 800 38D, 5.2.1.1 if len(nonce) > 2**64 - 1: raise ValueError("Nonce exceeds maximum length") self.nonce = bytes(nonce) """The nonce originally used to create the object.""" self._factory = factory self._key = bytes(key) self._tag: Optional[bytes] = None # Cache for MAC tag self._mac_len = mac_len if not (4 <= mac_len <= 16): raise ValueError("Parameter 'mac_len' must be in the range 4..16") # Allowed transitions after initialization self._next = [Method.UPDATE, Method.ENCRYPT, Method.DECRYPT, Method.DIGEST, Method.VERIFY] self._no_more_assoc_data = False # Length of associated data self._auth_len = 0 # Length of the ciphertext or plaintext self._msg_len = 0 # Step 1 in SP800-38D, Algorithm 4 (encryption) - Compute H # See also Algorithm 5 (decryption) hash_subkey = factory.new(key, self._factory.MODE_ECB, **cipher_params).encrypt(b"\x00" * 16) # Step 2 - Compute J0 if len(self.nonce) == 12: j0 = self.nonce + b"\x00\x00\x00\x01" else: fill = (16 - (len(self.nonce) % 16)) % 16 + 8 ghash_in = self.nonce + b"\x00" * fill + long_to_bytes(8 * len(self.nonce), 8) j0 = _GHASH(hash_subkey, ghash_c).update(ghash_in).digest() # Step 3 - Prepare GCTR cipher for encryption/decryption nonce_ctr = j0[:12] iv_ctr = (bytes_to_long(j0) + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFF self._cipher = factory.new( key, self._factory.MODE_CTR, initial_value=iv_ctr, nonce=nonce_ctr, threads=threads, **cipher_params, ) # Step 5 - Bootstrap GHASH # (it uses as many threads as the CTR cipher, which checks the parameter) self._signer = _GHASH(hash_subkey, ghash_c, self._cipher._threads) # Step 6 - Prepare GCTR cipher for GMAC self._tag_cipher = factory.new( key, self._factory.MODE_CTR, initial_value=j0, nonce=b"", **cipher_params ) # Cache for data to authenticate self._cache = b"" self._status = MacStatus.PROCESSING_AUTH_DATA def update(self, assoc_data: Buffer) -> GcmMode: """Protect associated data If there is any associated data, the caller has to invoke this function one or more times, before using ``decrypt`` or ``encrypt``. By *associated data* it is meant any data (e.g. packet headers) that will not be encrypted and will be transmitted in the clear. However, the receiver is still able to detect any modification to it. In GCM, the *associated data* is also called *additional authenticated data* (AAD). If there is no associated data, this method must not be called. The caller may split associated data in segments of any size, and invoke this method multiple times, each time with the next segment. Args: assoc_data (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): A piece of associated data. There are no restrictions on its size. """ if Method.UPDATE not in self._next: raise TypeError("update() can only be called immediately after initialization") # See NIST SP 800 38D, 5.2.1.1 if self._auth_len + len(assoc_data) > _MAX_AAD_LEN: raise MessageTooLongError("Additional Authenticated Data exceeds maximum length") self._next = [Method.UPDATE, Method.ENCRYPT, Method.DECRYPT, Method.DIGEST, Method.VERIFY] self._update(assoc_data) self._auth_len += len(assoc_data) return self def _update(self, data): assert len(self._cache) < 16 if len(self._cache) > 0: filler = min(16 - len(self._cache), len(data)) self._cache += bytes(data[:filler]) data = data[filler:] if len(self._cache) < 16: return # The cache is exactly one block self._signer.update(self._cache) self._cache = b"" update_len = len(data) // 16 * 16 self._cache = bytes(data[update_len:]) if update_len > 0: if update_len < len(data): # Do not copy the data data = memoryview(data)[:update_len] self._signer.update(data) def _pad_cache_and_update(self): assert len(self._cache) < 16 # The authenticated data A is concatenated to the minimum # number of zero bytes (possibly none) such that the # - ciphertext C is aligned to the 16 byte boundary. # See step 5 in section 7.1 # - ciphertext C is aligned to the 16 byte boundary. # See step 6 in section 7.2 len_cache = len(self._cache) if len_cache > 0: self._update(b"\x00" * (16 - len_cache)) @overload def encrypt(self, plaintext: Buffer) -> bytes: ... @overload def encrypt(self, plaintext: Buffer, output: Union[bytearray, memoryview]) -> None: ... @overload def encrypt( self, plaintext: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None ) -> Optional[bytes]: ... def encrypt( self, plaintext: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None ) -> Optional[bytes]: """Encrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization. A cipher object is stateful: once you have encrypted a message you cannot encrypt (or decrypt) another message using the same object. The data to encrypt can be broken up in two or more pieces and `encrypt` can be called multiple times. That is, the statement: >>> c.encrypt(a) + c.encrypt(b) is equivalent to: >>> c.encrypt(a+b) This function does not add any padding to the plaintext. Args: plaintext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to encrypt. It can be of any length. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the ciphertext must be written to. If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned. Returns: If ``output`` is ``None``, the ciphertext as ``bytes``. Otherwise, ``None``. """ if Method.ENCRYPT not in self._next: raise TypeError("encrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()") if self._msg_len + len(plaintext) > _MAX_MSG_LEN: raise MessageTooLongError("Plaintext exceeds maximum length") self._next = [Method.ENCRYPT, Method.DIGEST] ciphertext = self._cipher.encrypt(plaintext, output=output) if self._status == MacStatus.PROCESSING_AUTH_DATA: self._pad_cache_and_update() self._status = MacStatus.PROCESSING_CIPHERTEXT self._update(ciphertext if output is None else output) self._msg_len += len(plaintext) return ciphertext @overload def decrypt(self, ciphertext: Buffer) -> bytes: ... @overload def decrypt(self, ciphertext: Buffer, output: Union[bytearray, memoryview]) -> None: ... @overload def decrypt( self, ciphertext: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None ) -> Optional[bytes]: ... def decrypt( self, ciphertext: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None ) -> Optional[bytes]: """Decrypt data with the key and the parameters set at initialization. A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same object. The data to decrypt can be broken up in two or more pieces and `decrypt` can be called multiple times. That is, the statement: >>> c.decrypt(a) + c.decrypt(b) is equivalent to: >>> c.decrypt(a+b) This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext. Args: ciphertext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to decrypt. It can be of any length. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the plaintext must be written to. If ``None``, the plaintext is returned. Returns: If ``output`` is ``None``, the plaintext as ``bytes``. Otherwise, ``None``. """ if Method.DECRYPT not in self._next: raise TypeError("decrypt() can only be called after initialization or an update()") if self._msg_len + len(ciphertext) > _MAX_MSG_LEN: raise MessageTooLongError("Ciphertext exceeds maximum length") self._next = [Method.DECRYPT, Method.VERIFY] if self._status == MacStatus.PROCESSING_AUTH_DATA: self._pad_cache_and_update() self._status = MacStatus.PROCESSING_CIPHERTEXT self._update(ciphertext) self._msg_len += len(ciphertext) return self._cipher.decrypt(ciphertext, output=output) def digest(self) -> bytes: """Compute the *binary* MAC tag in an AEAD mode. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver, together with the ciphertext. Returns: the MAC, as a byte string. """ if Method.DIGEST not in self._next: raise TypeError("digest() cannot be called when decrypting or validating a message") self._next = [Method.DIGEST] return self._compute_mac() def _compute_mac(self): """Compute MAC without any FSM checks.""" if self._tag: return self._tag # Step 5 in NIST SP 800-38D, Algorithm 4 - Compute S self._pad_cache_and_update() self._update(long_to_bytes(8 * self._auth_len, 8)) self._update(long_to_bytes(8 * self._msg_len, 8)) s_tag = self._signer.digest() # Step 6 - Compute T self._tag = self._tag_cipher.encrypt(s_tag)[: self._mac_len] return self._tag def hexdigest(self) -> str: """Compute the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `digest`. Returns: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string. """ return self.digest().hex() def verify(self, received_mac_tag: Buffer) -> None: """Validate the *binary* MAC tag. The caller invokes this function at the very end. This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid (that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been tampered with while in transit. Args: received_mac_tag (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. """ if Method.VERIFY not in self._next: raise TypeError("verify() cannot be called when encrypting a message") self._next = [Method.VERIFY] if not compare_digest(self._compute_mac(), received_mac_tag): raise ValueError("MAC check failed") def hexverify(self, hex_mac_tag: str) -> None: """Validate the *printable* MAC tag. This method is like `verify`. Args: hex_mac_tag (string): This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. """ self.verify(unhexlify(hex_mac_tag)) @overload def encrypt_and_digest(self, plaintext: Buffer) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]: ... @overload def encrypt_and_digest( self, plaintext: Buffer, output: Union[bytearray, memoryview] ) -> tuple[None, bytes]: ... def encrypt_and_digest( self, plaintext: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None ) -> tuple[Optional[bytes], bytes]: """Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step. Args: plaintext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to encrypt. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the ciphertext must be written to. If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned. Returns: The tuple ``(ciphertext, tag)``, both ``bytes``. The ciphertext is ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. """ return self.encrypt(plaintext, output=output), self.digest() @overload def decrypt_and_verify(self, ciphertext: Buffer, received_mac_tag: Buffer) -> bytes: ... @overload def decrypt_and_verify( self, ciphertext: Buffer, received_mac_tag: Buffer, output: Union[bytearray, memoryview] ) -> None: ... def decrypt_and_verify( self, ciphertext: Buffer, received_mac_tag: Buffer, output: Optional[Union[bytearray, memoryview]] = None, ) -> Optional[bytes]: """Perform decrypt() and verify() in one step. Args: ciphertext (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The piece of data to decrypt. received_mac_tag (byte string): This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. Keyword Args: output (bytearray/memoryview): The location where the plaintext must be written to. If ``None``, the plaintext is returned. Returns: the plaintext as ``bytes`` or ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter specified a location for the result. Raises: ValueError: if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with or the key is incorrect. """ plaintext = self.decrypt(ciphertext, output=output) self.verify(received_mac_tag) return plaintext def _create_gcm_cipher(factory, **kwargs): """Create a new block cipher, configured in Galois Counter Mode (GCM). Args: factory (module): A block cipher module, taken from `Crypto.Cipher`. The cipher must have block length of 16 bytes. GCM has been only defined for `Crypto.Cipher.AES`. Keyword Args: key (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher. It must be 16 (e.g. *AES-128*), 24 (e.g. *AES-192*) or 32 (e.g. *AES-256*) bytes long. nonce (bytes/bytearray/memoryview): A value that must never be reused for any other encryption. There are no restrictions on its length, but it is recommended to use at least 16 bytes. The nonce shall never repeat for two different messages encrypted with the same key, but it does not need to be random. If not provided, a 16 byte nonce will be randomly created. mac_len (integer): Length of the MAC, in bytes. It must be no larger than 16 bytes (which is the default). threads (integer): The maximum number of threads used to encrypt or decrypt long data (default: 1, no extra threads; 0 for all CPU cores). """ try: key = kwargs.pop("key") except KeyError as e: raise TypeError("Missing parameter:" + str(e)) nonce = kwargs.pop("nonce", None) if nonce is None: nonce = get_random_bytes(16) mac_len = kwargs.pop("mac_len", 16) threads = kwargs.pop("threads", 1) # Not documented - only used for testing use_clmul = kwargs.pop("use_clmul", True) if use_clmul and _ghash_clmul: ghash_c = _ghash_clmul else: ghash_c = _ghash_portable return GcmMode(factory, key, nonce, mac_len, kwargs, ghash_c, threads)